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Abstract
In recent years, a call has been made to bring domestic politics back in to the research on EU 
compliance. Various researchers have heeded this advice and developed political theories o f  EU 
compliance. Some o f  these authors view compliance as a process o f domestic preference aggregation, 
which can be analyzed using the conventional tools o f analytical politics. Others view compliance as a 
process o f  norm-taking in which member states internalize new norms through processes o f 
persuasion, learning, or socialization. Differences notwithstanding, the two views are united in their 
basic view o f  politics: both revolve around the substantive likings o f actors involved in compliance- 
whether coined in terms o f preferences or norms. This paper challenges this overly substantive focus, 
and highlight the role o f  procedural politics in processes o f  compliance. Generalizing important 
findings o f social psychologists, it argues that actors’ willingness to comply is also influenced by their 
perceptions o f procedural legitimacy, i.e. fairness in the decision-making process. It tests this 
hypothesis for the case o f timely transposition, using a focused comparison o f two directives 
transposed in the Netherlands. The conclusion is that perceptions o f  procedural illegitimacy may lead 
to severe problems o f compliance and hence thwart the EU ’s objectives.
1 Introduction
The EU has an impressive track record. What started out as a scheme for bringing peace and 
prosperity to Europe has evolved into a potent regime that regulates an astonishing variety o f  policy 
areas. Many o f these policies are decided by a majority o f  the member states- a significant break with 
the principle o f unanimity that characterizes regular schemes o f international cooperation. In 
addition, the EU has developed strong mechanisms to enforce its policies. These mechanisms are 
unprecedented and without parallel in other international organizations. The EU seems to be the 
living p roof that international organizations may become more than the sum o f their national parts.
Yet many scholars have a hard time ignoring their realist reflexes. Could it be that the 
member states try to evade the E U ’s invasive influence by shirking their duties? Add to this the 
European Commission’s alarms about the ‘implementation deficit’ and a fascinating topic for 
research is born. Since the late 1980s, many authors have addressed the question to what extent the 
member states try to ‘make European policies work’ (Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988). In other words: to 
what extent and under what conditions do member states comply with EU policies?
In recent years we have witnessed the maturing o f  the field o f EU compliance. Initially an 
eclectic mixture o f  legal, administrative and political explanations (Mastenbroek, 2005; Treib, 2008), 
the literature has taken on a much more theoretical character since recent. The current consensus 
seems to be that domestic politics must enter the equation (Treib, 2003; Mair, 2004; Falkner et al, 
2005; Mastenbroek, 2005; Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006). Only then might we be able to 
understand why member states at times break EU law, while other times doing their utmost best to 
give timely and full effect to EU injunctions. Puchala’s 1975 advice to open up the black box o f  the 
state and study the domestic dilemmas concerning EU compliance is now  widely heeded.
We can discern two different types o f  theories on the ‘politics o f  compliance’. A first group 
o f researchers has applied rational choice insights to the matter o f EU compliance. Generalizing 
Haverland’s (2000) insight that compliance involves several veto players that interact in their
response to EU policy inputs, several rational choice oriented authors view transposition as a process 
in which various domestic stakeholders must agree on a particular transposition outcome (Dimitrova 
and Steunenberg, 2000; Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; Steunenberg, 2006, 2007, Kaeding 2008a).1 
Central to these accounts are the preference constellations o f domestic actors, who are assumed to 
want to maximize their utility in transposition processes. In other words, compliance becomes a 
matter o f  substantive politics, revolving around the question ‘who gets what, how, and when’ 
(Kaeding, 2008a, 116).
The rational choice account o f compliance is higly atomic and calculative view in nature, and
thus disregards the ‘normative pull’ actors may experience when involved in the process o f
. . . . . .  2transposition. This normative pull has been theorized by sociological institutionalists. The core
notion o f this branch o f  institutionalism is that life is organized by relatively stable sets o f  shared 
meanings and practices (March and Olsen, 1996, 249). These ideational factors combine to form an 
institution, which may be defined as ‘a relatively stable collection o f  practices and rules defining 
appropriate behavior for specific groups o f  actors in specific situations’ (March and Olsen, 1998, 
948). Crucial to sociological institutionalism is the interaction between institutions and behavior. The 
central mechanism linking the two is the logic of appropriateness. It supposes that actors’ behavior is not 
so much led by rational choice, but by duties and obligations (March and Olsen, 1984, 741). 
Institutions provide standards o f obligation, which help actors to assess which course o f  action is 
expected from them  in a certain situation. ‘Individuals face choices all the time, but in doing so they
1 It must be noted that many recent rationalist contributions- or contributions including rationalist 
explanations- assume the member state to be a unitary actor, operating strategically in its decision to 
comply (Mbaye, 2001; Linos, 2007; König & Luetgert, 2009; Perkins & Neumayer, 2007; Thomson, 
Torenvlied, & Arregui, 2007; Toshkov, 2007; Zhelyazkova & Torenvlied, 2009).
2 In this paper, I use the label sociological institutionalism also to refer to IR constructivism. The main 
difference is that the former originates in the field of international relations, and the latter in comparative 
politics (Risse, 2000). The two approaches are essentially the same in outlook; that is, if we concentrate on the 
modernist version of constructivism (Checkel, 1999, 554). First, both approaches subscribe to the logic of 
appropriateness as the mechanism underlying human behavior. A second core characteristic is the mutual 
constitution of structure and agency, of norms and actors- even though in reality both approaches usually 
bracket institutions (see Checkel, 1998 and Sending, 2002; for a more reflexive approach, see Wiener, 2004). 
Third, both approaches stress collectivism instead of the methodological individualism underlying rational 
choice institutionalism.
seek guidance from the experiences o f  others in comparable situations and by reference to standards 
o f obligation’ (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991, 10).
To explain the fate o f directives within one member state, SI scholars have mostly viewed 
compliance as taking place on a rule-by-rule basis, with member states applying standards o f 
appropriateness to individual pieces o f  policy (for an overview, see Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). 
The core assumption o f this literature is that member states’ responses to integrative challenges are 
determined by their values, beliefs, and identities (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000, 21). Compliance 
thus is conceptualized as a piece-by-piece assessment o f EU policies in the face o f  pre-existing 
domestic norms, driven by ideational factors.3 I f  a directive fits a member state’s norms4, that state 
will deem the directive appropriate and speedily comply with it. I f  the m ember state finds the 
directive inappropriate, because it runs counter to national norms, compliance will be more time­
consuming, dependent on a process whereby the norm  is diffused into the domestic system, with 
internalization o f the rule as the endpoint (Sending, 2002, 456). One o f the key objectives o f  this 
literature has been to identify the mechanisms leading to norm  internalization in the face o f  a 
normative misfit, such as socialization, persuasion, and learning.
Whereas m ost IR theorists would agree that rationalism and constructivism differ in their 
ontological outlook (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Keohane, 1988; Checkel, 1998), their work is 
united by a crucial common denominator. Both rational choice and sociological institutionalists 
portray compliance as a process revolving around the substantive liking o f member states or their 
consituent parts- whether coined in terms o f  preferences or norms. This shared focus is nicely
3 Most constructivist studies take a top-down orientation, starting with the EU input, and ending with the 
policy result. Some authors, however, claim that we should work the other way around, stressing the agency of 
domestic actors, who use international norms actively and selectively (e.g. Gurowitch, 1999; Acharya, 2004).
4 So far, most of these accounts have been based on a unitary actor assumption, if mostly left implicit. For 
instance, Risse (2000, 29), in a study on socialization into human rights norms, distinguishes between 
governments or target states, transnational organizations, and domestic opposition located in civil society. This 
unitary actor assumption seems to have been borrowed from the broader literature of IR constructivism. Most 
IR constructivists are statists, even though few of them make this claim as explicitly as Wendt, who yields that 
‘the state-centrism of (his) agenda may strike some (...) as depressingly familiar’ (Wendt, 1992, 424). This 
implicit unitary actor view is in line with the conceptualization of the logic of appropriateness as a collective, 
rather than an individual property: norms are defined by the political and social system (March and Olsen, 
1984, 741).
captured by Toshkov (2007, 337): ‘A political vision o f compliance and implementation necessarily 
emphasizes the role o f preferences and attitudes. I f  transposition is a genuinely political process, then 
the analysis should start with what the actors want to achieve.’
The substantive orientation o f compliance theory is not surprising for rational choice 
oriented work, which has the strategic interaction o f rational individuals as its starting point. For 
sociological institutionalism, this substantive focus is less intuitive, as it does not do justice to March 
and Olsen’s original conceptualization o f the logic o f  appropriateness focus on the rules governing 
the business o f  politics (March and Olsen, 1984). It can be explained, though, by the historical origins 
o f constructivism, which arose as a response to IR rationalism, aimed at exploring the contents o f  
state interests (Checkel, 1998, 324). This ‘holistic and ideational’ agenda (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001), still echoes in IR constructivism. The procedural aspects o f  the logic o f appropriateness, 
though, have received hardly any attention. In addition, because o f its holistic character, 
constructivism it has an underdeveloped theory o f agency (Checkel, 1998; Sending, 2002), which 
makes it even less surprising that procedural perceptions o f decision-makers have not yet entered the 
equation.
This paper challenges the overly substantive focus o f present day constructivist work on EU 
compliance, highlighting instead the role o f procedural politics5. My main claim is that domestic 
actors base their stance towards EU obligations not only on substantive considerations, but also on 
the perceived legitimacy during the transposition process. This legitimacy is largely procedural in 
nature, i.e. referring to the perceived fairness o f the decision-making process.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the effects o f  legitimacy on compliance. 
A key to the ease o f  compliance, as I will argue, is with the procedural legitimacy as perceived by the 
players. I will proceed by developing a conceptual framework. The hypothesis will be tested on a 
focused comparisons o f  two directives transposed in the Netherlands. The next section will discuss 
the results and their implications.
5 Please note that this usage of the word is different from that used by Jupille (2004, 1), who defines procedural 
politics as ‘the everyday conduct of politics not within, but with respect to, political institutions.
2 Legitim acy and com pliance
A core insight in studies o f international relations and European integration is that legitimacy is 
crucial for international organizations to be effective. As for any political system, legitimacy is a 
crucial characteristic, for it buys the support and obedience o f  its citizens (Beetham and Lord, 1998, 
9). The key question in the ‘crowded territory’ o f EU legitimacy (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2007, 
1)6 therefore is whether the EU has a moral standing among its citizens (Beetham and Lord, 1998). 
In focusing on the legitimacy perceived by citizens, Beetham and Lord (1998) sidestep another level 
o f legitimation: that o f  the m ember state. Even though they indicate that ‘any regime is particularly 
dependent on the cooperation o f  its own officials and their acknowledgement o f its authority is 
therefore especially important,’ they do not follow up on this claim, paying attention to direct 
legitimacy only. Yet, if not sufficient to obtain full EU compliance (Beetham and Lord, 1998, 14), 
legitimacy at the level o f member states may be a necessary condition. This indirect legitimacy is 
central to the present paper.
In the field o f IR it has become widely accepted that the legitimacy o f international rules may 
lead to non-compliance (Hurd, 1999, 381). From this perspective, it is a bit puzzling that indirect 
legitimacy so far has received scant attention in the EU literature. Even though many EU rules and 
allocations directly impinge on citizens (Beetham and Lord, 1998, 13), m ost o f  them first need to be 
implemented by national authorities. A lack o f  perceived legitimacy at the level o f  implementers 
hence may hinder compliance. Yet and so far, fairly little attention has been paid to legitimacy at this 
level.7 What type o f legitimacy is likely to affect their stance towards compliance?
6 Even though this may be the case for the matter of direct legitimacy of the EU, this statement does not apply 
to the matter of indirect legitimacy.
7 A notable exception is the work by Beach (2005) concerning compliance with ECJ judgments. He argued that 
member states may feel compelled to follow EU law even in the absence of manifest instrumental incentives. 
However refreshing, Beach’s account suffers from a shortcoming, which makes it unsuitable for analyzing EU 
transposition: it views member states as unitary actors.
3 T he concept o f legitimacy: from substance to procedure
Legitimacy is at stake at many levels o f  generality. The main distinction is between legitimacy as a 
property o f  a rule or o f  a rule-making institution (Franck, 1990, 16; Hurd, 1999, 387). F0llesdal 
(2006, 450), drawing upon Easton (1965), refers to this distinction as between specific and more 
diffuse support. He proposes a range o f  objects o f legitimacy, ranging from particular policy 
decisions and particular political actors to more diffuse objects such as public institutions, the 
political order as a whole, a regime’s principles, and the political community. What level o f 
legitimation is m ost important for analyzing compliance? So far, several scholars o f  EU compliance 
have paid attention to legitimacy at the level o f  the EU as a political order, by measuring the effect of 
EU support (Lampinen and Uusikyla, 1998; Mbaye, 2001) or deference to EU law more specifically 
(Falkner et al, 2005). For instance, Sedelmeier (2008) argued that the new member states may have 
been socialized into ‘perceiving good compliance as appropriate behaviour for good community 
members’. He operationalized this type o f legitimacy by the general pro-EU stance o f  a country, but 
found no relationship with compliance patterns. Toshkov (2007) did find such an effect, and argued 
that substantial policy preferences can be outweighed by the strength o f support for the EU. ‘I f  an 
actor regards EU integration positively, it might be willing to tone down substantial concerns and 
proceed with swift and timely policy transposition and implementation’ (Toshkov, 2007, 339). This 
finding nicely parallels Easton’s argument that diffuse legitimacy may ensure specific support o f  
particular decisions and authorities (F0llesdal, 2006, 451).
Arguably, though, diffuse legitimacy is not the most suitable concept to explain EU 
compliance. First, because the EU is still a nascent institution, it is questionable whether such diffuse 
support already exists. Second, more diffuse legitimacy o f  the EU as a whole is ill-suited to explain 
intra-country variance in the ease o f  compliance. As various researchers have shown, there is 
considerable intra-country variance in the ease o f  compliance (Mastenbroek, 2003). This variation 
can hardly be explained by the EU ’s overall legitimacy as perceived in different member states. It
hence seems sensible to start at the lowest level o f  generality, that o f  individual rules. The question 
then becomes to what extent stakeholders attach legitimacy to the inputs into the compliance 
process, i.e. EU policies. To research this matter, we must discuss what makes rules legitimate in the 
eyes o f their addressees.
When considering sources o f legitimacy, we can draw on the crucial distinction between 
substantive and procedural conceptions (Clark, 2005, 18). According to the substantive view, rules may 
be deemed appropriate when they embody ‘proper ends and standards’ (Beetham and Lord, 1998, 3; 
ibidem). This type o f legitimacy is closely related to the substantive logic o f  appropriateness that has 
dominated the literature on compliance so far. I f  member states believe particular EU directives to 
embody ‘the proper ends and standards’, they are believed to comply swiftly and correctly. If, on the 
other hand, member states believe EU directives to be ‘inappropriate’, i.e. representing norms that do 
not fit well with a nation’s norms, compliance will suffer.
Substantive legitimacy should also be differentiated from the logic o f consequence that is 
central to rational choice institutionalism. Legitimacy may lead to a generalized ‘reservoir o f  support’ 
for authorities and a general willingness to obey rules, besides immediate self-interest (Tyler, 2006,
381). It hence offers individuals a reason for compliance with policies, regardless o f their perceived 
merits (Flathman, 2007,678). In other words, legitimacy offers a logic distinct from the substantive 
focus o f rational choice institutionalism. This is nicely captured by Franck (1995, 9): ‘I can 
understand the need to provide everyone with basic health care even if my personal level o f  health 
care will be lowered to achieve that objective.’ In other words, legitimacy is expected to exert a 
normative pull on the domestic stakeholders responsible for EU compliance.
Second and alternatively, legitimacy has been conceptualized in procedural terms (Clark, 2005, 
18). The question then becomes whether or not a particular policy has been adopted by the ‘rightful 
source o f authority’ (Beetham and Lord, 1998, 3; ibidem). Procedural legitimacy comes down to ‘the 
perception o f those addressed by a rule or a rule-making institution that the rule or institution has 
come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles o f right process’
(Franck, 1990, 19). Legitimacy, in other words, then depends on the extent to which people believe 
policies were made in accordance to what they believe to be a right process (Franck, 1995, 7).
The notion o f procedural legitimacy can be easily tied to the agenda o f  sociological 
institutionalism. As March and Olsen (1989, 52) argued, institutions organize the political process by 
providing a structure o f routines, roles, forms, and rules. Institutions provide the procedural 
framework within which politics takes place (March and Olsen, 1989). This function o f  institutions as 
standard operating procedures channeling the political process- rather than shaping the political 
process- so far has not received any attention in the literature on compliance. Compliance is then 
viewed as taking place in an institutionalized setting, or a ‘stable collection o f practices and rules 
defining appropriate behavior’ (March and Olsen, 1989, 22). These practices and rules may not so 
much relate to the contents o f  a particular directive or proposed measure for transposition, but also 
to the decision-making process. Smooth compliance in this view not only depends on the substantive 
fit o f  a rule with the norms o f  domestic policy makers, but also on the fit o f  the compliance process 
with the well-institutionalized rules and routines for decision-making that guide the behavior o f 
domestic stakeholders in compliance processes.
So far, this ‘procedural logic o f appropriateness’ has received barely any attention in the 
compliance literature (but see Grimes, 2006). The effect o f  procedural fairness on compliance is a 
rather new insight to the field o f IR  and EU studies,8 where compliance has been interpreted as a 
matter o f  substantive likings. This is a marked difference with the state o f the art in compliance 
research in an adjacent field, that o f social psychology. Here, a consensus has formed that 
perceptions o f procedural legitimacy exert a strong moral pull on people that may even overshadow 
actors’ self-interest and perceptions o f substantive legitimacy. The core finding from this surprisingly 
vast literature is that authorities and institutions are viewed as more legitimate when they use fair 
procedures, which in turn fosters acceptance o f  the decisions they make. This effect o f  procedural 
justice on legitimacy has been documented for legal, political, and managerial settings (Tyler, 2006,
8 Some notable exceptions to this rule are Applbaum (2000, 319)
382).9 Concerning legal settings, perceptions o f procedural justice increase the chances that people 
abide by the decisions o f police officers, judges, mediators, and other third-party authorities (Tyler, 
2001, 216). As for political settings, an important contribution has been made by Gangl (2003), who 
found that a perception o f procedural legitimacy leads to more positive assessments o f  the outcomes 
o f lawmaking.10 Concerning management, finally, researchers have reported that fair exercise o f 
authority leads to greater acceptance o f decisions11 (Tyler, 2006, 380; Tyler and Blader, 2005).
All in all, when people believe that decision-makers exercise their authority in a fair way, they 
become legitimate, which increases the chances o f  voluntary compliance with the decisions they 
make. This situation may have an important parallel in EU compliance: domestic constituents may 
base their decision whether or no t to comply at least partly on perceptions o f  procedural legitimacy. 
This expectation represents a break with the current literature, which is largely substantive in 
nature.12 This was also the case in the more general field o f social psychology. As Tyler (2001, 216) 
argues for public feelings concerning the police and the courts, the finding that procedural justice 
matters runs counter to many people’s ideas. O ur intuitive notion is that people base their views on 
legal authorities on the nature o f  outcomes they themselves receive. This intuitive prioritizing o f 
substantive considerations closely resembles the situation in IR and EU studies. In this field, the 
general assumption, uniting sociological and rational choice institutionalists, is that domestic actors 
judge international policies on their substantive merits, whether coined in terms o f  preferences, 
norms or output legitimacy. In reality, it may well be that procedural legitimacy, as perceived by 
domestic norm  takers, is an equally or more important driver o f  compliance.
9 It must be said that this literature makes a clear analytical distinction between the origins of legitimacy, among 
which procedural fairness, and the concept itself. This is a further refinement of the political science literature 
on legitimacy, which talks about procedural legitimacy, thus collapsing origins and content. For the present 
paper, I will choose the second option.
10 See Tyler (2006, 382) for a thorough overview of this literature.
11 It must be noted that, in a meta-analysis of 190 studies, Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) did not find an 
effect of perceived procedural justice on compliance.
12 It is all the more surprising that the notion of procedural justice so far has gone unnoticed in the field of IR, 
as this finding originates not from social psychology, a relatively ‘foreign’ field, but from dispute resolution 
theory, where it was introduced by Thibaut and Walker, already in 1975.
The importance o f procedural legitimacy chimes well with a literature less foreign to students 
o f EU compliance, that o f deliberative democracy (Elster, 1986, 1991, 1998; Page, 1996; Habermas, 
1984; Steenbergen et al, 2003; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). One alleged effect o f  ‘good’ 
deliberation is that it increases legitimacy. When people believe that they have been heard and treated 
correctly by the other parties in a deliberative process, they may accept results they otherwise would 
not, even when no preferences are changed by the deliberation (Shapiro, 2003, 123; Fearon, 1998b, 
56)13. Conversely, low discourse quality, for instance in the form o f manipulation or threats (Neblo, 
2005, 175) may destroy the goodwill o f participants to open up to the views o f  others, thus 
diminishing possibilities for compromise. Serious breaches o f  the maxims o f deliberation may cause 
inter-group hostility in deliberative processes, bringing differences to the surface (Shapiro, 2003, 
123). Such breaches may destroy the ‘good faith’ (Johnson, 1998, 174) o f  other participants and 
hence cause the conflict to escalate. When the deliberators do not perceive other participants as 
friendly, but as a rival “outgroup” (Sunstein, 2003), the members o f  the former group will be less 
receptive o f the other party’s arguments. As a result, the two groups will polarize, and shift towards a 
more extreme point than held in the beginning (ibidem, 81). Deliberation under these conditions is 
expected to result in stalemate, with the various groups fiercely opposing each other.
13 There is a crucial difference between this body of literature and the IR literature that views compliance as a 
process of deliberation (Checkel, 2001; Risse, 2000). That is, the latter has substantive normative misfit center 
stage and uses deliberative theory to explain normative change, in the sense of socialization, learning or 
persuasion. Deliberative theory, as well as procedural legitimacy as such, does not have consensus as its 
analytical endpoint. As becomes clear form the Shapiro quote, good deliberation may lead to acceptance of 
policies, without normative change having taken place. Legitimacy provides political systems with the capacity 
to induce citizens to accept defeat (Grimes, 2006, 306). Please note that this expectation goes against the 
argument made by Hurd (1999) that legitimacy leads actors to revise their interests.
4 Towards a procedural legitim acy m odel
All in all, I believe that we should refocus the sociological institutionalist work on compliance on the 
notion o f  procedural legitimacy, in line with the more general findings in the field o f  social 
psychology. In doing so, I restrict myself to the stage o f transposition, which is a first and crucial step 
in the overall process o f  compliance. Furthermore, I want to point out that procedural considerations 
are expected to play a role next to substantive considerations (cf. Tyler, 2001; Grimes, 2006).
In order to model the transposition process, I make the following assumptions. First, 
transposition is a process in which various domestic actors interact. I thus depart from the unitary 
actor assumption, which has been central to m ost SI work on compliance, if often implicitly. I 
assume that several domestic have a formal or informal veto position in transposition, as posited by 
Steunenberg (2006). Second, these actors have their normative position regarding the transposition 
o f a particular directive. Whereas some norms are shared by all o f society, others are very much 
group-specific (Elster, 1989, 99; Johnston, 2001, 495). Such a disaggregated view would be in line 
with the recent finding o f Zürn and Checkel (2005, 29) that we should theorize the role o f  domestic 
politics in EU socialization. Also, it echoes the more general call made in IR theory to bring domestic 
politics back in if we want to understand compliance (Haggard and Simmons, 1987, 513; Keohane, 
1988, 392; Milner, 1998, 767; Checkel, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005, 29).
What is the ‘cognitive sequence’ (Grimes, 2006) in the mind o f those involved in 
transposition? As is depicted in figure 1, the dependent variable is the willingness to agree with a 
particular proposal for transposition, made by the agenda-setter.14 This variable basically has two 
values: contestation or deference.15 Domestic actors involved in the process make this decision on 
the procedural fairness they experience. This procedural fairness may take two forms: first, it may 
concern the EU decision-making process. I f  any o f  the actors deem this to have been unfair, they
14 This variable is more attractive than that of ‘transposition timeliness’ per se, because the latter can be 
influenced by a host of other variables.
15 This is parallel to the dependent variable in the social psychology literature, which is contestation of a 
decision-making outcome by its objects (cf. Grimes, 2006).
may frustrate the transposition process. A second level is the transposition process: if any o f the 
actors perceives this to be unfair, they may frustrate the process. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis: the lower the proceduralfairness of either the decision-makingprocess or the transposition process as 
perceived by its participants, the less willing they are to accept a proposalfor transposition.
Figure 1 Cognitive sequence
A question that arises from this model is how perceptions o f procedural fairness relate to substantive 
norms. What if an actor agrees with a particular proposal for transposition, but does no t perceive EU 
decision-making or the transposition process as fair? Vice versa, what happens if an actor deems 
these processes fair, but does not agree with the proposal for transposition? In the first case, I expect 
procedural considerations to come second to substantive considerations. In other words: substantive 
fit is a sufficient condition for deference to a transposition proposal. Vice versa, I expect procedural 
legitimacy to be a necessary condition for deference to a proposal in the case o f  a substantive misfit 
as experienced by any o f the actors. In other words, a fair decision-making process may lead people 
to accept outcomes they do not favor.
5 M ethod, data, and operationalization
In order to test the hypothesis formulated above, I carry out a focused comparison, based on a 
previous statistical model on the time needed for transposition, which comprised various legal and 
administrative variables (Mastenbroek, 2003). The particular procedure followed is nested analysis as 
described by Lieberman (2005). According to this method, statistical analysis is followed by in-depth 
study o f an outlier and a comparable ‘on-the line case’, which is a case that was well-explained by the 
model. The objective o f this analysis is to identify any omitted variable bias, i.e. systematic factors 
that explain the bad fit o f  a statistical model (King, Kehoane, and Verba, 1994, 168).
The first step in case selection was to compile a list with the ten worst outliers. With an eye on 
the availability o f interviewees, only fairly recent cases were selected. The selected outlier was 
directive 1997/27 on the masses and dimensions o f  m otor vehicles, which was transposed two years 
after the deadline, and had a standardized residual o f  2.23. The similar ‘on-the-line’ case was directive 
1998/76 on access to the profession o f road transport operator. Despite their difference in the 
dependent variable, time needed for transposition, these two cases were highly similar. Both were 
revisions o f older directives. Both directives were transposed through modification o f an 
administrative order by the Ministry o f  Transport. One difference is the time allotted for 
transposition. This difference is unproblematic, though, because the ‘slow’ directive had more time 
allotted than the one that was transposed on time. Moreover, as there is no statistical difference 
between directives adopted by codecision versus consultation, this variable is not crucial either. 
Finally, both directives were plagued by obsurities, and transposed in a period o f a shortage in 
administrative capacity. All considered, the cases are similar enough to warrant a focused 
comparison.
Figure 2 Comparison of selected cases
outlier control case
97/27 (masses and 
dimensions)
98/76(access to 
the profession)
allotted time 104 w eeks 52 w eeks
decision-making proc. codecision consultation
clarity poor poor
administrative capacity poor poor
legal m easu re administrative order administrative order
lead ministry Transport Transport
num ber of ministries 1 2
novelty modification modification
existing legislation yes yes
transposition yes yes
transposition timing 95 w eeks  after the deadline 8 w eeks  before the deadline
D ata on the hypotheses were gathered through a combination o f qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews and document analysis. For each directive, a member o f the European Commission, 
national civil servants, and members o f relevant interest groups were consulted. Also, prospective 
enforcers and relevant experts were enforced, so as to increase intersubjectivity. I made sure that 
both adversary and advocate opinions were heard. As a second step, document analysis was 
performed to further substantiate the views o f the interviewees. I cross-checked the information as 
much as possible using written materials, or by getting back to the interviewees.
H ow  about operationalization? The key variable, that o f procedural justice, was measured 
using the Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed by Steenbergen et al (2003). The D Q I was 
developed to assess the discourse quality o f parliamentary debates, scoring speeches on the first five 
criteria mentioned above. The sixth, authenticity o f  expressed preferences, is excluded from the 
index, because the authors find that it is impossible to empirically ascertain to what extent a stated 
preference is true (Steenbergen et al, 2003, 26). The unit o f  analysis o f  the D Q I is a speech, an 
element o f  the debate voiced by a participant. An individual may hold various speeches. For coding 
purposes, only the speeches containing a demand are included, i.e. a proposal about the decision to 
be made (ibidem, 27).
However useful, the D Q I also suffers from several important disadvantages. First, the index 
can only be applied to the cases that have been transposed through a statute, and no t to the cases for 
which delegated legislation was used, as there are no written transcripts o f the deliberation process 
available. Second, the index is rather narrow in scope, due to its focus on the actual parliamentary 
debate. It runs the risk o f neglecting aspects o f the broader decision-making process o f which the 
debate forms a part. The actual parliamentary debate may be conducted when the decision has 
already been made. This harbors the risk o f several biases. For instance, the D Q I operationalizes the 
requirement o f open access by counting the num ber o f times a speaker is interrupted. However, it 
seems more interesting to see which actors are allowed to participate in the broader process o f 
decision-making, o f  which the parliamentary debate is but one stage. Also, deliberation is not 
necessarily a face-to face activity; it may also take the shape o f  textual exchange between institutions 
(Tulis, 2003, 200-201), and possibly also take place in rather informal settings. Therefore, analyzing 
the parliamentary debate will only reveal a subset o f  the actual process. Third, it can be doubted if the 
various speeches that serve as the units o f analysis can be viewed as independent. It can be expected 
that disrespect towards one player in one particular speech act will lead to ‘tit-for-tat’ disrespect by 
that player in a subsequent speech. Fourth, the discourse quality index is not suited for the present 
study because it requires multiple coders, with an eye on reliability. Therefore, I suggest using a less 
sophisticated but more valid and feasible operationalization. Instead o f quoting all speeches, I will 
look for flagrant violations o f these criteria, as perceived by the participants to the process.
6 Trucks versus transport operators
6.1 M asses and dim ensions
In 1970 the member states adopted framework directive 70 /156/E E C  on the type-approval o f 
m otor vehicles and trailers. The directive’s end goal was a situation in which vehicles fulfilling EU- 
wide standards could be placed freely on any member state’s market without having to meet 
additional or different criteria. The directive sought to achieve this aim by setting a procedure for EC 
type-approval o f vehicles. Under the umbrella o f  the 1970 framework directive, a great number o f 
follow-up directives have been adopted, covering the features and components o f various types o f 
vehicles. One o f these directives, 1997/27, concerned the masses and dimensions o f  trucks and 
buses. This directive lists the technical requirements that vehicles must meet in order for their 
producer to obtain an EU type-approval. The directive is extremely technical in nature, setting 
maximum dimensions and explaining how masses and dimensions should be measured.16
The directive finds it origin on a Commission proposal dating back to 1991.17 The 
negotiations took place primarily in Council working groups. Due to the technicality o f the directive, 
technical experts played a key role. For the Netherlands, negotiations were carried out by the 
Government Road Transport Agency (Rijksdienst voor het Wegverkeer or RDW). This is an independent 
regulatory agency charged with regulating road transport. Amongst other things, it is responsible for 
the admission o f vehicles and their parts, as well as monitoring o f manufacturers and vehicles. 
During negotiations, the Netherlands only had some minor, technical objections to the Commission 
proposal (interview).
The directive’s key provision is article 2, which specifies that no member state may refuse to 
grant EC type-approval or national type-approval o f  a vehicle type, or prohibit the sale, registration, 
entry into service or use o f  an individual vehicle, on grounds relating to its masses and dimensions if
16 The directive does not set maximum masses, as the negotiators did not reach consensus on this point. One 
of the interviewees indicated that he doubts that harmonization of this aspect will ever be reached.
17 Commission proposal COM(91)23 def.syn 348.
these satisfy the requirements set out in Annex I to the directive. The text refers to directive 96/53 
for the maximum dimensions, providing definitions o f these for measurement purposes. Whereas it 
does not harmonize the masses o f  vehicles, it does provide a uniform procedure for measuring a 
vehicle’s mass, which member states have to apply upon request by a manufacturer. Finally, the 
directive contains several highly technical derogations.
Table 1 Key elem ents of directive
Element Required or optional Discretion
requirements for EC type-approval required no
requirements and definitions for 
m easu rem en t
required no
derogations optional yes
The directive fit rather well to the existing D utch standards. Yet those involved in 
transposition agree that the directive was far from crystal-clear on the question whether or not it 
provided for full harmonization. This would have been disastrous for Dutch transport companies, as 
some o f the directive’s requirements were more restrictive than existing national requirements. 
Mainly, this concerned the question whether so-called axle lifts should be included when measuring a 
vehicle’s length. The question was whether or not member states could maintain such less stringent 
national requirements.
The transposition process consisted o f  modifying the M otor Vehicles Regulation, and 
various ministerial decrees. The responsibility for this process was borne by two policy divisions 
from the Ministry o f  Transport: the Directorate-Generals o f Road Haulage, and o f Passenger 
Transport. In reality, however, m ost work was done by the division o f Legal Affairs. This division 
was responsible for drafting the transposing measures and had to consult the Government Road 
Transport Agency (RDW), which had the required expertise. These two actors played the main part 
in the transposition soap that was to ensue.
At the Legal Division, a ‘super specialist’ in transport law (interview) drafted the bill. After 
an impressive 1,5 years o f  work, he submitted the bill to the RDW  for an assessment. Convinced that 
the directive provided for full harmonization, he had dutifully transposed all requirements listed by 
the directive as obligatory for national type approval. This interpretation came as a total surprise to 
the RDW, which wanted to keep several looser requirements. It rejected the proposal, arguing that 
the member states were free to impose looser requirements for national type approval as long as they 
would not discriminate against cars meeting the stricter requirements (Staatsblad, 2001, nr. 448, p. 7; 
interview).
The conflict between the lawyer and the RDW  was bitter and persistent. Trying to win the 
conflict, the legal officer gathered evidence to support his point o f  view. He composed a memo 
containing an advanced legal argument, arguing that the directive implied total harmonization. The 
RDW  argued that, as it attended the negotiations, it knew better and that it had been obvious 
throughout the decision-making process that the directive only provided for partial harmonization. 
The legal officer denied this, stubbornly maintaining his carefully concocted legal argument. He 
further aggravated the conflict when the stated that the RDW  formally only had an advisory role, and 
that it could not veto proposals for transposition. Yet the RDW  refused to give the green light. As a 
next step, the legal counsel contacted the European Commission, hoping to get the authoritative 
answer that the directive provided for total harmonization. Soon, though, he received a phone call 
from the Commission, declining. In July 1999, still not convinced, he sent a formal letter to the 
European Commission, carefully stating his point o f  view. Again, and this time on paper, the 
Commission answered that the directive did no t make EC type approval complete, and that the 
requirements could coexist with national ones. The civil servant refused to accept the Commission’s 
answer, allegedly because a civil servant too low in the hierarchy had composed it (interview). In the 
words o f  another interviewee ‘he thought he knew better than the EU legal experts.’
All this time, the policy divisions, who should have coordinated the process, did not 
intervene. The conflict could not be resolved until the civil servant from the legal department was
replaced, which happened late 1999, when the deadline had already expired. This lawyer soon 
concluded that the directive indeed did no t entail total harmonization. The result was that the new 
and stricter requirements would no t become mandatory, which was good news to the RDW, as well 
as the transport and vehicle business. The new civil servant drafted a new proposal for transposition, 
which was adopted in September 2001, two years after the deadline.
6.2 A ccess to the profession o f road haulage operator
A cornerstone o f European road transport policy concern access to the profession o f road haulage 
operator. By these directives, the Commission seeks to regulate the quality o f  EU transport. Directive 
1996/26 laid down the basis for this system. The system laid down by this directive works as follows: 
if a person wants to start a transport company, they must request a permit from the national 
authorities, which depends on the fulfilment o f certain requirements: good repute, financial standing, 
and professional competence. Diplomas granted in the various member states must be mutually 
accepted. Yet integration was insufficient. The criteria for obtaining a permit differed greatly between 
the member states. Some countries were known for their leniency on diplomas, which led to 
‘diploma tourism’. To prevent a race to the bottom, the European Commission in 1997 proposed a 
new directive, with stricter requirements.
The Netherlands wholeheartedly embraced the Commission proposal, supporting the aim 
for stricter requirements for transport operators. In the 1990s, the Netherlands was plagued by 
diploma tourism. Allegedly, the Ministry o f  Transport actively lobbied for the directive, and ‘even 
went to the European Commission to make its case’ (interview). The Netherlands’ main concern was 
to improve the standards o f  professional competence, as the Netherlands had strict requirements and 
relatively demanding exams. The directive was adopted on 1 October 1998, and had to be transposed 
within only one year.
The main goal o f the resulting directive was to harmonize the criteria for access to the 
profession o f  road transport operator in national and international transport (see table 27 for an
overview). According to most o f  the interviewees, the directive modified the existing directive 96/26 
only slightly (see Mason, 2003). To begin with, the scope o f the directive was extended to smaller 
vehicles. Second, the condition o f good repute was made more stringent, as the directive adds 
environmental protection and professional liability as requirements. Also, no longer must a permit be 
taken back only when a serious and repeated offence is committed, but only when a serious offence is 
committed. Third, when it comes to professional competence, the content and organization o f the 
courses and exams were elaborated, and a three-year restriction on ‘diploma tourism’ was added. 
Fourth, the financial threshold for access to the profession was raised; transport undertakings now 
were to have reserves o f at least 9 000 Euro for the first vehicle, and 5 000 for each additional one. 
Finally, the directive contains some new provisions on enforcement, namely that regular checks were 
to be held every 5 years, to verify whether transport companies still fulfilled the criteria mentioned.
Table 2 Key elem ents o f directive
Topic Element Required or optional Discretion
sco p e extended  to smaller carriers required no
good repute - environmental 
protection and 
professional liability
- ‘re p e a te d ’ dropped
required disputed
financial s tanding - higher threshold required disputed
professional - content and - required no
com petence organization of cou rses  
and exam s 
- three y ears  restriction 
to diploma tourism
- optional
enforcem ent - verification every five 
years
required no
The interviewees agree that overall, the goodness o f fit with existing legislation was rather good. The 
Netherlands already had extensive rules for professional competence in place, as well as a financial 
threshold higher than the directive’s minimum. The only new point concerned the condition o f  good 
repute. As said, the directive listed two new grounds for withdrawal o f  a permit, and dropped the
word ‘repeated’. Whereas some interviewees claimed that the Netherlands already complied with this 
point, others hold that this implied a large misfit for the Netherlands, as the existing points system 
that implemented the provisions on good repute was based on the notion o f repeated offences. On the 
basis o f  the points system, a permit could only be withdrawn after a company had committed serious 
and repeated offences. Therefore, there was a serious policy misfit. Possibly, the respondents did not 
acknowledge this because this misfit was played down during the transposition process.
Transposition o f the directive required changes in two administrative orders in the fields o f  
road haulage and passenger transport, and two ministerial decrees. In addition, the new rules had to 
be further operationalized by various functional agencies. The directive was discussed in a project 
group, consisting o f representatives from the directorate-generals o f  Road Haulage and Passenger 
Transport. Around 1997, two legal counsels from Legal Affairs were added to the group, both those 
responsible for road haulage and passenger transport. Formally, the two policy divisions were veto 
players. The legal department played a somewhat weaker role than in the previous case, as the policy 
departments wielded the formal clout.
The transposition stage consisted o f three stages: drafting, consultation and further detailing. 
Whereas the latter two were fairly unproblematic, the former was fairly politicized The main issue 
concerned the new requirements for good repute. Earlier, this requirement had been transposed by 
means o f a so-called points system. Transport operators were given penalty points four offences 
against good repute, such as violations o f the rules on driving times. After gathering a certain number 
o f points, NIW O could withdraw a transport operator’s permit. In reality, though, the system did not 
work. As a result o f  privacy legislation, the courts would not forward information on offences to the 
NIW O. The NIW O was hence unable to apply the points system to withdraw permits. What is more, 
breaches o f employment conditions, as specified by directive 96/26, do no t fall under criminal law, 
but under civil law. Unfortunately, breaches o f  employment conditions are hardly ever reported, as 
m ost employees are reluctant to file a lawsuit against their employer.
The ministry’s legal department therefore recommended replacing the points system with a 
new system. They proposed that the judges themselves could be made responsible for withdrawing 
permits. However, there was much resistance to this view. To begin with, the established business 
was no t particularly keen on a new system, no t wanting to increase the likelihood o f losing their 
permits. According to one o f  the interviewees, the points system was initially designed with ‘the 
knowledge that it would not work anyway’. The main interest o f  established business was to keep out 
unwanted competition, while protecting its own position. The views o f  the policy sections diverged. 
Initially, the directorate-general for road haulage initially did no t want a better system, fearing 
negative publicity for the minister. Later, it changed its opinion. However, it was opposed by 
Passenger Transport, which did no t want a better system. After intense discussions, no solution 
could be found and it was decided to maintain the ineffective system.
A related issue concerning good repute was that directive 98/76 speaks o f  ‘serious offences’, 
whereas directive 96/26 speaks o f ‘repeated and serious offences’. However, the notion o f repetition 
was the building block o f  the points system. As stipulated by article 34 o f  the Road Haulage Decree, 
a road haulage operator does no longer comply with the criteria o f good repute if, in a three years 
period, he is repeatedly convicted o f  serious offences. Therefore, officials from the legal department 
argued that the system had to be modified. The policy divisions did no t support this wish. The 
lawyers composed several memos, explaining why this went against the directive, but the relevant 
policy official decided that the existing positions would suffice for ‘Brussels’.
Another issue concerned the threshold for financial standing. As said, the directive raised the 
amounts required to start a transport undertaking to 9000 Euro for the first, and 5000 for each 
additional truck. Yet the Netherlands wished to maintain its higher threshold o f 18.000 Euro. This 
implied that for companies with one truck, the D utch criteria were higher than those o f the directive. 
There was great consensus among the policy departments, businesses and the trade unions that this 
was desirable, so as to keep out unwanted newcomers. The legal department, however, maintained 
that the directive did no t allow for this possibility. They argued that the phrase ‘at least’ did related to
the amount o f  capital to be held by the undertaking, and no t to the level o f  the threshold set by the 
member states.
Eventually, the greatest part o f the directive was transposed in time, as the administrative 
order modifying the existing administrative orders in the fields o f road haulage and passenger 
transport entered into force on 1 O ctober 1999.18 Transposition was not completely correct, as the 
provisions for good repute still imply ‘repeated offences’. Another problem concerns the continued 
infeasibility o f  the points system, as set out above. The old system does not work, but no new system 
has been devised either.
7 D iscussion
The case descriptions lead to the following finding regarding discourse quality. In the case o f 97/27, 
discourse quality was very low. When it comes to the openness of participation, the RDW  felt aggravated 
by a lack o f  involvement in the drafting stage, and by the minimalist interpretation o f its advisory role 
provided by the legal officer. Vice versa, the legal officer felt aggrieved by the fact that he was not 
consulted during negotiations. Several people from the legal service express their annoyance about 
the fact that the R D W  dominated the negotiations, without involving the lawyers. What is more, 
there seems to be an important problem with the respect towards counterargument's, as the legal officer 
brushed aside the interpretations o f the European Commission that went against his own point o f 
view. Also, the R D W  breached the maxim o f justification, claiming that it knew better because it had 
attended the negotiations. In addition, the fierce clash o f personalities that occurred implied that the 
process was far from constructive. As several interviewees report, after a while the two sides were not 
even on speaking terms, which made decision-making impossible.
18 Staatsblad, 1999, 352.
In the case o f 98/76, discourse quality was rather low for the part on road haulage. Here, the 
lawyers also complained about their lack o f  involvement in the negotiations. As becomes clear from 
the interviews, this is a more general problem at the ministry. As one interviewee remarks rather 
pitifully: ‘They don’t let me join them. (...) The good ones inform us, but often they even forget that. 
Involving the lawyers is simply not the habit at Transport’. On the other side o f the spectrum, a 
policy officer complains: ‘They even want to join us to Brussels! They would prefer to constantly sit 
next to you, to sit on your chair. (But) policy isn’t made by lawyers.’ Second, concerning respect 
towards counterarguments, the carefully argued memos written by the legal officer to defend his 
views o f the issues o f  good repute and financial standing were no t considered seriously by the policy 
officers. None o f the interviewees on that side even remembered reading them. Finally, personalities 
are also reported to have clashed here, and the process is reported to have been far from 
constructive.
I f  both directives score similarly low on discourse quality, how come transposition was 
timely for the first, and not for the second directive? The answer is with hierarchical intervention. 
Numerous interviewees reported that tu rf wars diminish at higher levels in the hierarchy. In the case 
o f 97/27, transposition was stalled because the responsible policy department, Road Haulauge, did 
not intervene. As indicated by five o f  the seven interviewees, its role was highly unsatisfactory. The 
division did not intervene in the conflict, allegedly because it did no t understand the technical 
complexities o f  the directive, and because the topic had low political priority. Also, because o f alleged 
capacity limitations, it could no t develop this expertise (interview). It is claimed to have lacked in 
leadership and expertise. The conflict hence remained at a lower level, instead o f  being solved higher 
up in the hierarchy. In contrast, transposition o f 98/76 was timely because the policy divisions were 
involved from the start. Even though the legal officials tried to persuade them that the points system 
needed to be abolished and the financial threshold needed to be lowered, they did no t have the 
formal power to push through their point. The policy divisions played an adequate role in
coordination and control, as opposed to the masses and dimensions case. As there were no conflicts 
to speak o f between the two policy divisions, transposition was timely.
The cases also show a factor that aggravates problems with input legitimacy, namely the 
different images o f implementation held by lawyers and policy officers. In both cases, decision­
making was impeded by the fact that policy officials and lawyers spoke different ‘languages’ and had 
different views o f  the transposition duty in general. The lawyers reported to take great pride in 
honestly interpreting the directive and its contents. In the words o f one o f  the interviewees: ‘as 
lawyers we are trained to be perfectionists. We often have almost theological discussions about those 
directives, aiming at getting it completely right. We do so out o f professional skill and pride.’ It is 
striking that the interviewees from the legal department generally do not speak o f  ‘issues’ or 
‘conflicts’ in the transposition process, but rather o f  ‘problems’, understood as ambiguities arising 
from the directive, and differences in understanding. Along these lines, the policy officials see the 
lawyers as self-perceived guardians o f  the law, somewhat out o f touch with the real world, 
interpreting directives far too strictly and perfectionist. As a policy official remarks, ‘they want to do 
it too well and too accurately.’ Another interviewee remarks that the lawyers should take a more 
acquiescent stance, and merely translate policy ideas into legislation.
Vice versa, the lawyers complained that the policy officials are too lenient when it comes to 
EU law. National political objectives are deemed central by policy officials, and are thought to take 
primacy over EU law. Allegedly, policy officials will go to great lengths to dodge unwelcome EU 
directives, and lawyers are expected to assist them in doing so. This is acknowledged by one o f the 
policy officials, who acclaims that transposition may be difficult ‘when we have ideas that run 
counter to a directive.’ The problem, according to a lawyer, is that in the end, ministers can ‘score’ 
with national policies, but not with transposition. It hence seems that policy officials on the one hand 
and lawyers on the other hand, have incompatible normative views o f transposition. That is, the 
underlying standards o f  appropriateness held by the two groups seem to diverge. The policy officials 
take a rather political stance, viewing transposition as secondary to national politics, and deeming it
legitimate to dodge EU law if called for. The lawyers, however, generally are committed to legal 
purity and perfectionism, attaching primacy to the implementation duty o f  member states.
Finally, as the interviews bear out, the problems between the legal department and policy 
divisions are more than an idiosyncratic cause for delay. As six o f  the eight interviewees indicate, 
transposition problems are regularly caused by conflicts between policy officials and lawyers. 
Whereas some interviewees were rather neutral in their wording, others were more outspoken, 
sketching a situation o f trench war, or o f  two different tribes coexisting. One o f them even estimated 
that a quarter o f  the delays are caused by such conflicts. It also must be noted, though, that the legal 
department is internally divided on its role vis-à-vis the policy departments. Whereas one group o f 
lawyers takes a very legalistic and perfectionist stance, attaching primary importance to the rule o f 
EU law, another group agrees that political considerations should take primacy over legal concerns. 
One o f the interviewees belonging to the latter group holds that it is the role o f  legal officers to ‘help 
out “policy” by conceiving o f  tricks’. It may be that perceptions o f restricted procedural justice lead 
lawyers to adopt a more rigid stance.
H ow  about the conflict with the RDW, though, which delayed transposition o f 97/27? This 
seems not an idiosyncratic finding either, as the interviewees agree that the difficult relationship 
between the ministry and the RDW  is a notorious cause o f  transposition problems. Allegedly, the key 
problem is that all technical expertise is with the RDW, while the policy sections do not assume a 
clear supervisory role. A couple o f  years ago, the legal department has tried to mitigate this problem 
by organizing regular the before mentioned ‘triangle meetings’ between the policy divisions, the legal 
department, and the RDW. According to one interviewee, these meetings have indeed solved the 
problem, as problems are solved much faster. O ther interviewees, however, claim that the meetings 
do no t function well, as the policy sections still do not take real interest. All in all, it seems that 
problems with transposition may flourish in a culture o f  mutual disrespect and perceived procedural 
injustice.
8 Conclusion
Problems with compliance are not necessarily caused by substantive problems, but instead may be 
the result o f  protracted tu rf wars between various stakeholders involved in transposition. The two 
transposition processes described in this chapter both suffered from serious conflicts between civil 
servants responsible for policy choices and lawyers responsible for drafting o f transposing measures. 
Two mechanisms underpin these conflicts. First, lawyers in the Ministry o f Transport generally feel 
aggrieved by the fact that they are not at all consulted in an early stage. Second, both groups have 
entirely different conceptions o f the transposition process, which are hard to bring into line with 
each other. The general picture is that the lawyers at the ministry view directives as ‘biblical 
messages’, doing their utmost best to accurately transpose the difficult concepts contained by them. 
Policy specialists, for their part, especially when involved in the negotiations, tend to view directives 
as political compromises, and transposition as a political process. More relaxed about the prospects 
o f being found out, they try to model transposition after the wishes o f  business or their minister. 
These orientations clash frequently and often lead to delayed transposition. This may lead to delay 
when, as occurred in the masses and dimensions case 97/27, the higher-level coordinators do not 
intervene. In the second case, the policy dimensions were involved from the start, as a result o f  
which the legal division could not exercise its veto.
In sum, procedural legitimacy seems to matter. Actors may experience a serious sense o f 
aggravation when they are excluded from decision-making processes. Perceptions o f procedural 
injustice, as becomes clear from the discussion o f the masses and dimensions case, may lead to 
‘negative emotional reactions in the forms o f mood and anger’ (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001, 
308-309). As can be seen from these cases, the ‘intellectual wars’ that ensue when veto players 
perceive decision-makers to be unfair are hard to solve, which may lead to protraction o f the 
compliance process.
Yet this is not to say that substantive considerations do not play any role. As Tyler (2001) 
argued, instrumental considerations may co-exist with notions o f  procedural fairness. Rather than 
drawing up either/or accounts o f compliance, we should try to synthesize these different motives 
into our work. Also, it seems more fruitful, after all, to view procedural legitimacy as a more 
structural concept. That is, when transposition processes become standard operating procedures, 
chances become that perceptions o f  unfairness in one process become generalized, thus thwarting 
the ease o f compliance in other cases, as became clear from the first case.
To conclude, this paper has made some contributions that in my view merit further thought. 
First, There is a need to come to grips with the notion o f indirect legitimacy, i.e. the legitimacy 
perceived by decision-makers. Whereas this aspect o f legitimacy has barely received attention so far, 
it might offer an important clue for understanding the fate o f  the European Union and its policies. 
Second, political science has much to gain from incorporating non-substantive claims into our 
theories. Politics is not only about substance, it is also about emotion. Jealousy, fairness, and other 
questions o f  ‘m ood and anger’ are important drivers o f human behavior. Currently ending up in the 
error term o f our neat but bloodless models, they deserve a role in our theories. Compliance may be 
a m atter not only o f reasoned reflection about the merits o f  international rules, but o f  less visible 
considerations o f procedural politics. Let us turn to the adjacent field o f  social psychology and find 
out to what extent procedural justice plays a role in EU compliance.
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